This paper is concerned with the technical implications of a certain view connecting existence to predication. This is the view that in no possible world is there a genuine relation among the nonexistents of that world or between the nonexistents and the existents! The meaning of the term 'genuine' here may be variously explained. On an extreme interpretation, all relations are 'genuine', so that none of them are to relate non-existents. On a milder interpretation, the genuine relations are those that are simple or primitive in some absolute sense. But even without appeal to an absolute concept of simplicity, we can require that all relations should be analyzable in terms of some suitable set of relations, relating only existents to existents.
apply to nonexistents, they are neither true nor false of them. Under the other, the primitive predicates do apply to the non-existents, but are false of them.
For the first actualist, there is no more to say of a possible world than that there are certain relations among the existents. If the extensions of the predicates are to be extended to non-existents then this must be done by convention. One could adopt the Falsehood Convention, that the predicates are to be false of non-existents; but one could equally well adopt any other convention in its place. For the second actualist, however, it is true to say that the relations fail to hold among nonexistents; and that they do not hold is not a matter of convention but of principle. One could not equally well say, for example, that the relations always hold of nonexistents.
For someone who holds to the first type of actualism, the standard semantics of modal logic, as presented in [8] , is problematic; for ir requires that the extensions of the predicates be defined over all possible objects in each possible world. Now our actual&t could simply eschew the standard semantics. This is, in effect, the approach of Prior in his system Q ([lo], Chaps. IV-V), who sets up the semantics in such a way that appeal to the extension of a predicate over nonexistents is never required. But there is also a way in which our actualist may make use of the standard semantics; for he may arbitrarily extend the extensions of the predicates to existents and nonexistents alike, thus making that semantics applicable.
However, in the resulting truth-conditions, not all sentences of the modal language will be on a par. For the truth-value of some of them in a world will depend upon how exactly the extensions of the predicates are extended to non-existents, while the truth-value of others will not so depend. In so far then, as the behaviour of nonexistents is a conventional feature of the model, it is only the latter class of sentence that will prove acceptable to the actuahst. Now one simple syntactic device for securing the desired independence from nonexistents is to require that each non-logical predicate P always occur in contexts of the form 'E3cr . . .x,, &x1, . . . ,x, all exist', for the extension of the predicate over nonexistents can then make no difference to the ensuing truth-conditions. Our first technical result is a sort of converse to this: any sentence whose truth-value is independent of the behaviour of nonexistents is logically equivalent to one whose predicates MODEL   THEORY  FOR  MODAL  LOGIC  -PART  III   295 are existentially restricted in this way. Thus, the actualist loses nothing by limiting himself to such sentences in the first place. Like Theorem 13 of [4] (herafter called 'Part I'), the above result is an instance of a preservation theorem, with equivalence to a member of a syntactically characterized class of sentences being explained in terms of the given sentence preserving its truth-value in the transition from one sort of model to another. The proof, which is rather trivial, is given in Section 1. What is surprising is that the result no longer holds when the underlying logic is replaced with an arbitrary theory. In other words, something may be lost in confining one's attention to existentially restricted sentences when the models to be considered are required to verify a certain class of non-logical axioms. The exceptions to the result and some extensions of the result for different semantic conditions or for different languages are given in Section 2.
The framework of the standard semantics for modal logic is not problematic on the second version of actualism. The predicates will always apply to non-existents in each possible world even if their extensions only include the existents. However, this version, and the other, may raise a problem for analysis; for they require that predicates which are true of non-existents be analyzed in terms of predicates which are not. Now on a certain view, upheld, among others, by Prior ([lo], Chaps IV-V), Plantinga ([9] , Chaps VII-VIII) and Stahraker ([ 1 l] , pp. 333-336), no predicates, simple or complex, are true of non-e&tents. On this view, then, there would be no problem of analysis, since there would be no predicates that stood in need of analysis. However, it has always seemed clear to me that there are complex predicates, such as the external complement of existence, that are true of non-existents and, moreover, that the analysis of some of these predicates, such as the outer truth-predicate of Section 8 in [7b], is problematic. If this is so, the actualist doctrine requires, for its vindication, a detailed programme of analysis.
In Section 3, I consider the question of when existentially unrestricted predicates can be analyzed in terms of restricted predicates. It is shown that such an analysis is possible under two separate sufficient conditions. The first is that any two possible objects both exist in some possible world and that each world contain infinitely many actuals. The second is that there be infinitely many necessary existents. It is also shown that such an analysis can always be given so long as the domain of objects is appropriately expanded.
In the proofs, it is only required that the analyses preserve the first-order truths for the respective predicates. In regard to particular predicates, the analyses may not be acceptable -either because they do not preserve all truths or because they do not explain the complex in terms of the more simple. What the results do is to remove certain technical obstacles to the programme of analysis required by this form of actualism.
I should emphasize that I have not, by any means, given a complete account of the technical, let alone philosophical, issues raised by Predicate Actualism. One might consider alternative semantical schemes for the actual& philosophy, their relationship to one another, and to other, more standard, schemes. For example, the semantics for Prior's system Q can be plausibly modified or extended in various respects. On the other hand, one might take the supervaluation route, stipulating that a sentence should be super-true just in case it is true under the standard semantics, no matter what the behaviour of the nonexistents. In another direction altogether, one might follow the lead of [5] and lay down conventional postulates which guarantee that any sentence is equivalent to one acceptable to the actualist. It is not required that the logical predicates = and E be subject to a similar requirement. For E, the requirement is of no significance. For =, it is not; but it does no harm. Each occurrence oft = s can be rewritten as O(t=sI\Et/\Es).
The formula 9 is impZicitZy restricted in the theory T if (J is equivalent to a restricted formula in T, and q? is impZicitZy rest&ted if it is implicitly MODEL   THEORY  FOR  MODAL  LOGIC  -PART  III   297 restricted in the quantificational system S5 of Part I. For example, 3x q (Ex 1 Px) is implicitly restricted since it is equivalent in S5 to 3x q (Ex 3 Rx A Ex).
As in Section 4 of Part I, we may show that an implicitly restricted sentence in T is equivalent in T to a restricted sentence.
Internal Indistinguishability
We now define the model-theoretic counterpart to being implicitly restricted.
Let 'u = (W, 2, v) be a structure and w a world in W. Recall from p. 144 of Part I that Y-is the language Ywithout its constants. Then we let Relative to a theory T, say that 9 is preserved under internally indistinguishable models if whenever 'BI and W are models for T, !Dl k 9 and !LN ii R then 9I I= 9. We wish to show that a sentence is implicitly restricted in SS (not arbitrary theory T) iff it is preserved under internally indistinguishable models.
One direction requires: LEMMA THEOREM 2. Suppose the sentence 4 is implicitly restricted in T. Then whenever!BI and 9I are models for T, '$I k $I and!UI ii R then '8 k @.
Proo& By lemma .l .
For the other direction we require two definitions. Given a model 9JI , let the restriction % = %?I of !LR be the model that differs fromlll only in the respect that pw (R) = vw(R) f-12: for each n-place predicate R of .!?' and world w E W. Thus in R the extensions of the predicates are restricted to existents. Given a formula I#+ let she the result of replacing each atomic subformula Rt, . . . t, in # with Et, . . . tn. Then we have the desired result: THEOREM 3. The sentence 0 is implicitly restricted (in SS) iff whenever '$I and 9 are models, %I k 9, and%JI ii '9 then 9I I= 9.
Proo$ The * direction follows from Theorem 2. For the other direction, we shall show that S5 I-$I =-&under the supposition that V%R, FJZ (a/= f#~ &%i% *fl F f#~).%Riii%R. Soby the supposition,~j= 4 iff $ k 9. An easy induction shows that 2JI I= $ iff IDZ I= 6. Hence, 'DI k 9 iff !BI k &, and so, by completeness, S5 I-9 E 6. This completes the proof.
Call a theory T restricted if it can be given restricted axioms, i.e., if there is a set A of restricted seqences such that T = (4 : 4 a sentence and A j-$1. Then the above result can be extended to restricted theories. COROLLARY 4. The sentence @ is implicitly restricted in a restricted theory Tiff whenever W and !R are models for T, Iuz I= 4, and 9JI ii '8 then 9I t= 9.
I+oo./I As for Theorem 3. We need only verify thatlDZ is a model for T iff '#I is 3 model for T. But this follows from the fact that T is restricted.
Corollary 4 can be extended in the obvious way so as to apply to formulas, sets of sentences' and necessary equivalence. In each case, the proofs of these results show something stronger. For the restricted equivalents can be effectively obtained by replacing each formula @ with $. In this section we fast show that the previous preservation theorem does not hold for arbitrary theories. We then show that the theorem holds when the model-theoretic condition is strengthened or when the language is enriched.
Negative Results
Let 9 be the sentence 3xEx A Vx3y 0 Rxy, and let T be the theory with axioms 9 and q VXO ($3 Ex) v 0 3x0 (4 3 -Ex). Let JI be the sentence q VXU (+ 3 Ex). Then J/ is preserved under internally indistinguishable models of T. For suppose that '3lI and R are models for T,!fJl ii '3 and %B!=$.Then!R l=$. 
UT 7(AU) : Q7(2)aT(4)---
It is easy to verify the following:
(1) (2) '33 and '3 are both models for T; p = {(a,, a2,) : a, E A), %lI and '3 satisfy the condition of Lemma 5 (for given p' defined on (a,, . . . , a,) for which p'&) = azi, let O(Qi) = (zZ~ for 1 di~n,o(ai)=a~,_tforn<i~2n,ando(ai)=aifor2n<i). THEORY  FOR  MODAL  LOGIC  -PART  III   301 sentence IIxEx in T. However, it is possible to construct other counterexamples to the preservation theorem for a language with possibilist quantifiers. Indeed, these difficulties run deep; and in [6] , it is shown that the Interpolation Lemma also fails for quantified S5.
Positive Results
By weakening the notion of internal indistinguishability, it is possible to find a semantic counterpart to being implicitly restricted in an arbitrary theory.Foreachn=O, 1,2,.. . , let us define an isomorphism relation =:n between models as follows: There are two other positive results of interest. First the preservation theorem for arbitrary theories holds for weaker modal logics such as T and S4 with the old notion zi used in place of =. Thus the preservation theorem also holds for theories containing S5 as long as St-models, say, are permitted. Second, the preservation theorem holds for the classical language Y* of Section 2 in Part I. In this case, a sentence is restricted if each atomic subformula R*wtl . . . t, occurs in the context R*wtl . . . tn A E*wtl A . . . A E* wt, . These results may be proved by the classical method of diagrams or by the modal method explained in Section 3 of Part I. Then r is said to be a translation from ,Yinto9". Let T and T' be theories in Yand 9" respectively, and let r be a translation from9 into 2". Then 7 is an interpretation of T in T' if T I-9 iff T' j-r(G) for each sentence (J of 2'; and T is interpretable in T' if there exists an interpretation r of Tin T'.
CallatheoryTresttictiueif(o)(Rxl...x,3Exl~...~Ex,)isa theorem of T for each n-place predicate R. Then our original question takes the form: when is a theory interpretable within a restrictive theory? MODEL   THEORY  FOR  MODAL  LOGIC  -PART  III   303 There are some simple examples of such interpretations. Let us use x~yforx=y~Ex~E'andx5yforxEy~Exr\Ey.'Thentreating= as a non-logical predicate, x = y may be defined as 0(x E y) and, under the assumptions of [7a] , x E y may be defined as 0(x E y); and so the theory of the unrestricted predicate may thereby be interpreted within an appropriate theory of the restricted predicate. However not all theories are thus interpretable. For example, consider the theory T whose axioms are 3x1. (i) says that any two possible objects possibly co-exist. I call it the Ainciple of PossibZe Co-existence. For some domains the principle does not hold. Assume, for example, that the fact-that-p exists iff p is the case. Then for contingent p, the possible fact-that-p and the possible-fact-thatnot-p cannot co-exist (see [7c] ). (ii) simply says that each world contains an infinite number of existents.
We shall show that any theory T satisfying the fmt conditions is interpretable within a restrictive theory T'. The language 9 of T' contains the same constants as 9, a one-place predicate F, a three-place predicate P, and a one-place predicate R' for each predicate R in the language 9'of T. Intuitively speaking, F is true of a in world w if II is w; P is true of a, b and cinwifa,bandcexistinwandcisthepair(a,b);andR'istrueofain w if a exists in w, a is the (n + 1)tuple (v, al, . . . , a,) and R is true of (al,. . . , a,) in D. This interpretation presupposes, of course, that the worlds are individuals and that the domain of individuals is closed under a pairing function. Since !UI satisfies the conditions (i) and (ii), such a sequence exists. For each n > 2, define a n-tpling function p" as follows: for R an n-place predicate of 5?' ' is also true in9.B ', and so r(G) is not a theorem of 2". Thus, Lemma 7 is proved. Since T' is a restrictive theory and since T was an arbitrary theory satisfying the first conditions, we obtain: THEOREM 8. Any theory satisfying the first condition is interpretable within a restrictive theory.
Condition Two. Let us say that a theory T satisfies the second condition if*r... . Thus, a theory satisfying the second condition is one which implies that there are infinitely many necessary existents.
To show that such a theory T is interpretable within a restrictive theory T', let the language Y' of T' contain the same constants as E": a two-place predicate C, and for each n-place predicate R of Pan n-place predicate R'. Further Results. gay that the translation r is weak if for some formula qbD(x) with one free variable x the translation clause for the universal quantifier is: Thus, in a weak translation, the original domain may be a restriction of the new domain. Correspondingly, say that T is weakly interpreiable in T' if for some weak translation r from Yinto P", T I-@ iff T I-r(G) for each sentence 9 of 9. Now introduce a new one-place predicate G into the previous language 9' and modify the previous translation T so that #n(x) is Gi. Then the new T is a weak interpretation of any theory T into the corresponding restrictive theory. For in obtaining the model '2JI ' from %JI we may expand the domain so that '2R' contains infinitely many necessary existents. Thus, this gives: THEOREM 10. Any theory is weakly interpretable within a restrictive theory.
Some open problems remain. First, necessary and sufficient conditions have not been given for interpretability within a restrictive theory. I doubt that there are any perspicuous conditions of this sort. Second, no conditions have been given for a theory T to be mu?ualZy interpretable within a restrictive theory T', where this last notion requires that there be a translation r from T into T' and a translation 7' from T' into T, possibly with the added proviso that T I-/(+I)) s @ and T' I-r(#($)) z J, for each formula r$ of 9'and each formula J, of 2". Finally, we should like to know the scope of particular translations. For any translation T, we should like to determine the theories T for which r is an interpretation of T within the restrictive theory that has the axioms r(e) for $ E T.
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